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External Diseconomies in Competitive Supply: Comment
By GEORGE A. HAY AND JOHN J. MCGOWAN*
In a recent article in this Review, Charles
Goetz and James Buchanan (G-B) assert
that " . . . the standard description of mis-
allocation in the presence of external produc-
tion diseconomies is misleading . . . "because
these e.xternalities produce a " . . . combina-
tion of exchange-inefficiency with produc-
tion-inefficiency [which] renders the con-
struction of correction devices much more
difficult" (p. 889). Stated otherwise their
contention is that with external diseconomies
that are internal to an industry, i.e., those
that each firm in an industry inflicts on other
firms in the same industry, a competitive
regime in the presence of a per unit tax on
output designed to eliminate the difference
between private and social marginal cost will
not achieve a Pareto optimum. The com-
petitive equilibrium even after the imposi-
tion of the corrective tax lies inside the
production possibilities frontier.'
The purpose of this note is to suggest that
the G-B analysis while technically correct is
based on a set of assumptions that differs in a
particular aspect from what we believe to be
the assumptions of the neoclassical paradigm.
Moreover within the framework of the neo-
classical model we show the standard pre-
* Associate professors, Yale University. We are grate-
ful to William Brainard, Joseph Stiglitz, and Martin
Weitzman for helpful comments.
' As G-B point out, the issue involves technical rather
than pecuniary externalities since it is well known that
the latter cause neither exchange nor production ineffi-
ciency. Moreover we assume G-B intended to restrict
their analysis to external diseconomies in the produc-
tion of a final (consumption) good rather than an inter-
mediate good. We think it is clear that the neoclassical
writers have recognized that external diseconomies in
an intermediate goods industry would cause the un-
regulated competitive equilibrium to lie inside the
economy's production possibilities frontier, since pro-
ducers of final products would be led to choose inefficient
input combinations. However even in this case the neo-
classical writers, correctly we believe, would claim that
a simple Pigovian tax on the intermediate product in
question would restore full Pareto optimality.
scription regarding a corrective tax to be
correct. As it turns out, the difference be-
tween the G-B model and the neoclassical
model is likely to be negligible in any mean-
ingful application but in any case we show
that in the G-B model, a lump sum tax im-
posed on top of the standard Pigovian per-
unit tax will restore full Pareto optimality.
G-B assume that the total cost function of
any firm has the following specific functional
form:
( 1 ) C i ^ a> I, b>0
where 5,- is the firm's own output, Qi is the
aggregate output of all other firms in the in-
dustry, and where b>0 indicates the pres-
ence of a technological external diseconomy.
All firms are assumed to have the same cost
function.
A general version of such a cost function is
the following:
(2) c, = giT/n, T)
where c,- is total costs for firm i, T is total in-
dustry output and n is the number of firms
in the industry. Since all firms are assumed
to have the same cost function, efficiency re-
quires that output be distributed evenly
among them. Thus, with n firms, each will
produce T/n units. ^
Dropping the subscript i, we can write
total industry costs for any output T as:
(3) = nc = ng{T/n, T)
The first condition for Pareto optimality
is that of production efficiency, i.e., any
output T should be produced at minimal
' Near the end of their paper, G-B generalize their
original cost function in the form: }{T/n, T—T/n).
Obviously, without further restrictions on g or/, the two
are indistinguishable. We use (2) because it highlights
the key neoclassical assumption more effectively, but
the identical result can be obtained using the G-B
version.
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total cost to society. The policy variable for
the "social planner" is T/n, or since T is
given, n. Thus we wish to minimize total in-
dustry costs with respect to n for a given T.
This requires:
(4) dTC
dn
= c -\- n
/ dc dT/n dc dT
\dT/n dn
do dT\
dT dn)
where
(5)
= c- gvT/n = 0
dc
dT/n
T/n
but c/(T/n) is average costs, AC, for each
firm. Therefore, efficiency in production re-
quires that production take place in each
firm up to the point where gi = AC.
The second condition for Pareto opti-
mality is efficiency in exchange. This in turn
requires that total industry output be ex-
panded to the point where price is equal to
social marginal cost. The latter is defined by:
dTC ( dc dT/n dc(6) - = n[ — +
dT \dT/n dT dT
\n I
where g^ =
= gi +
dc
dT
Thus the condition for exchange efficiency
reduces to:
(7) P = gi
On the other hand, profit maximization for
the firm requires that production be ex-
panded to the point where price equals pri-
vate marginal cost, MC. The latter is de-
fined by:
dc dc dc dT
(8) MC = = \ —
dqi dT/n dT dqi
dT
= gl + g2 —
dqi
/ dT \
= gi + gi (since — = 1 )
where we have used the qt term to indicate
that the marginal cost for any one firm pro-
ducing T/n is defined in terms of increasing
only its own output, with all other firms con-
tinuing to produce at T/n.^
We assert that a key assumption of the
neoclassical paradigm is that firms regard
any increase in costs caused by the disecon-
omy effect of higher industry output as an
exogenous shift in their cost curves, unre-
lated to changes in their own or industry
output.* This is equivalent to the assump-
tion that firms perceive gi as equal to zero.^
If this assumption about firms' perception
of gi is correct, the first condition for Pareto
optimality will be fulfilled, since competitive
equilibrium will be established where P = MC
= AC, which reduces to gi = c/{T/n) as in
(5). (Of course if gi is negligibly small, the
assumption is unimportant since we see
from (8) that equilibrium output and the
Pareto optimal output differ by the order of
gi. Moreover as we shall see, there is strong
reason to believe that gi will be negligibly
small in meaningful applications.)
To secure exchange efficiency, the neo-
classical economists prescribed a per-unit
tax on output. If that tax is set equal to ngi,
' Implicit in (8) is the assumption that the disecon-
omy effect is a function of total industry output inde-
pendent of its distribution among firms. This assump-
tion is not critical to the main results. We could have
written (1) as Ci — g(qi, qt+i, qt+i, . . . , ?,4.n_i). The
first-order conditions would be more complex but their
nature would not change. The G-B cost function does
not assume that the diseconomy is independent of the
distribution of total output but the nature of the
required tax is unaffected by this asymmetry.
* John Chipman in an elegant analysis of the neo-
classical argument makes this assumption most explicit.
' The spirit of this assumption is identical to that
under which a firm in perfect competition assumes that
expansion of its own output will not affect market price.
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we have as a condition for private profit
maximization:
(9) P - «g2 = gi
.'. P = gi -f ngi as required by (7)
Thus, under what we believe to be the as-
sumptions of the neoclassical paradigm for
external diseconomies, the prescription of a
per-unit tax equal to the difference between
private marginal cost and social marginal
cost is the correct one and is sufficient to
restore the economy to a Pareto optimal
position.
We note now that where n is large, as we
would expect in perfect competition, ng2 can
be significant even though gi is negligible.
Moreover, if g^ is not negligible, a tax equal to
ng2 would be so large as to probably require
a complete shutdown of the industry, or at
best an output so small that atomistic com-
petition would not be feasible and a totally
different set of controls would be required.
Therefore, in any case in which the prescrip-
tion of a Pigovian tax could be a feasible
remedy, there is reason to believe that gi
would in fact be negligibly small, and the
neoclassical assumption would not be un-
realistic.
Despite the above, if firms do not ignore
gi, then each firm expands production to the
point where P = gi-\-g2, and the tax required
to restore exchange efficiency is changed to
(w—1)^2. In that event, the production effi-
ciency condition will not be satisfied since
then we will have:
(10) F - (n -
thus:
T/n
(11) T/n
violating (5).
This situation can be remedied, however, if
we impose in addition to the per-unit tax, a
lump sum tax equal to gi-T/n. Doing so will
cause competitive equilibrium to be estab-
lished where:
(12) F - i n -
T/n
resulting in gi = c/{T/n) as required by (5).
Thus if firms regard the level of disecon-
omy as beyond their control, which we be-
lieve is the assumption of the neoclassical
paradigm, the Pigovian tax guarantees
Pareto optimality. Where firms recognize the
relation between industry output and their
own costs, the competitive equilibrium with
the Pigovian tax lies inside the production
possibilities frontier by a factor of the order
of g2 which it seems reasonable to expect will
be negligibly small when the number of firms
is large. In any case, full Pareto optimality
can be restored by a lump sum tax on top of
the Pigovian per-unit tax.
Examination of the G-B model reveals
that the only important difference between it
and the neoclassical model is precisely the
assumption about g2. In the G-B model the
diseconomy effect of an increase in a firm's
output (and therefore total industry output)
on its own costs is blended into the cost func-
tion along with direct costs and both are
assumed to be fully recognized by the firm
in deciding how far to expand output.
Thus G-B are correct in asserting that in
their model the competitive equilibrium, even
with the Pigovian tax equal to the difference
between private marginal cost and social
marginal cost, lies inside the production possi-
bilities curve. What we have shown is that
the remaining inefficiency should be negligi-
ble. In any case we have also shown that a
lump sum tax added to the per-unit tax will
be sufficient to restore full Pareto optimality.
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